



MINISTERSTVO VNITRA  
ČESKÉ REPUBLIKY

**REPORT ON MANIFESTATIONS OF  
EXTREMISM AND PREJUDICIAL HATRED IN  
THE TERRITORY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC  
IN 2018**

**Ministry of the Interior  
Security Policy Department  
Prague 2019**

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The text has not undergone any linguistic or stylistic editing.

# LIST OF CONTENTS

<b>1. INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>2. DEFINITION OF TERMS</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>3. REPORT ON EXTREMISM IN THE TERRITORY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN 2018</b> .....	<b>7</b>
3.1. SUMMARY .....	7
3.2. RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS .....	8
3.3. MANIFESTATIONS OF PREJUDICIAL HATRED .....	10
3.4. PARAMILITARY AND DOMESTIC MILITIA .....	13
3.5. ANARCHIST SCENE .....	14
3.6. RADICAL COMMUNIST SCENE .....	15
3.7. MEDIA SPREADING PREJUDICIAL HATRED .....	15
3.8. RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED EXTREMISM .....	17
3.9. STATISTICS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WITH AN EXTREMIST SUBTEXT .....	18
3.9.1. <i>Introduction</i> .....	18
3.9.2. <i>National statistics</i> .....	20
3.9.3. <i>Regional statistics</i> .....	21
3.9.4. <i>Statistics by acts</i> .....	22
3.9.5. <i>Crimes motivated by hatred against selected groups</i> .....	23
3.9.6. <i>Criminal offences committed by members of Security Forces</i> .....	24
3.9.7. <i>Criminal offences committed by members of the Army of the Czech Republic</i> .....	24
3.9.8. <i>Court statistics</i> .....	24
3.9.9. <i>Statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office</i> .....	25
3.9.10. <i>Statistics of the Probation and Mediation Service</i> .....	28
<b>4. FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON THE CZECH REPUBLIC</b> .....	<b>29</b>
4. 1. RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM ABROAD WITH INFLUENCE ON THE CZECH REPUBLIC .....	29
4.2. LEFT-WING EXTREMISM ABROAD WITH INFLUENCE ON THE CZECH REPUBLIC .....	31
4.3 RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM ABROAD .....	33
4.4 OTHER .....	34
<b>5. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....	<b>35</b>

## 1. Introduction

The Report on Manifestations of Extremism and Prejudicial Hatred in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2018 („the Report“) is submitted under the Government Resolution No. 873 of 17 December 2018. The Evaluation of the Conception on Combating Extremism in 2018 and the Conception on Combating Extremism in 2019 are submitted as separate documents.

The Report does not address all racist and xenophobic manifestations registered in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2018. Alongside members and sympathizers or extremist movements, the Report also addresses other hateful entities and phenomena that do not fulfill the criteria of the definition of extremism as used by the Ministry of the Interior. The political science perspective is not essential for the Ministry of the Interior. The MOI is interested in the hateful element, which is based on a prejudice concerning certain social groups.

The Report is written by the Ministry of the Interior. Representatives of the intelligence services, the Police of the Czech Republic, other state administration bodies – specifically the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office contributed the source material.

Spectator violence, also known as hooliganism, is addressed independently within the Ministry of the Interior.

The Report is written annually. New measures are adopted based on its findings.

The first section on the domestic scene is based on data provided by the Security Information Service and the Police of the Czech Republic, particularly experts on extremism from the National Centre against Organized Crime of the Criminal Police and Investigation Service, and Regional Directorates of the Police of the Czech Republic.

The statistics in the following section were provided by the Police of the Czech Republic, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Probation and Mediation Service of the Czech Republic.

The third section is dedicated to foreign influences impacting on the Czech extremist scene. It was written by experts from the Masaryk University in Brno with a contribution from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mainly through Czech Embassies in selected European countries.

The last section includes a list of used abbreviations.

## 2. Definition of terms

In this document, the definition of the term „**extremism**“ is identical to that of previous annual reports. The full definition was last published in the Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2002, approved by the Government Resolution No. 669 of 9 July 2003.<sup>1</sup> In this context, it is also relevant to refer to established case law as regards the interpretation of the term „movement“.<sup>2</sup> The full wording of the definition of extremism is available at <http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/co-je-extremismus.aspx> (in Czech only).

Not all entities mentioned in the Report engaged in illegal activities in 2018. From a long-term perspective, they nevertheless fulfill the criteria to be described as extremist, as defined in previous annual documents.

In addition to the concept of extremism, the Report introduces a concept of „**prejudicial hatred**“. It responds to the fact that the influence of traditional extremist entities is weakening. Their rhetoric and activities are gradually being taken over by other entities that cannot be unequivocally described as extremist.

Manifestations of prejudicial hatred refer to a behaviour that is motivated by intolerance and social biases against a particular population. In general, these are groups defined by race, nationality, ethnicity, religious, sexual orientation, political or other thinking, social origin, etc. It does not have to concern a real affiliation to a particular group, but it can refer to an alleged affiliation (e.g., if a person is mistaken for a Roma for their darker skin tone). Such manifestations do not necessarily imply a criminal offence. It can be physical violence, verbal attacks, or the use of offensive symbols. Manifestations of prejudicial hatred differ from the extremist ones, particularly by the fact that they do not have to be associated with any of the totalitarian ideologies. Persons who engage in such manifestations do not necessarily have to be members or supporters of extremist movements. They also lack a clear call to overthrow the system of pluralist democracy and replace it with a totalitarian regime.

The risks of manifestations of prejudicial hatred are in many areas similar to the dangers posed by extremists. They are listed below. Entities that engage in such risks:

- Do not seek the immediate destruction of the democratic system, but gradually weaken it.
- Do not respect the concept of fundamental human rights.
- Incite others to hate activities.
- Spread fear in society.
- Split society causing antagonisms.
- Lighten the fate of victims of totalitarian regimes and victims of hate crime.
- Use disinformation and conspiracy theories to communicate with the public.
- Become an instrument of influence of countries and groups that do not respect the principles of pluralist democracy.

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.mvcr.cz> (section „Security threats“, subsection „Extremism“ – „Strategy for combating extremism and Annual reports on extremism“).

<sup>2</sup> In particular the opinion of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court Tpjn 302/2005 (No. 11/2007 Coll.), and also the Supreme Court Resolutions 5 Tdo 79/2006, 5 Tdo 337/2002, 3 Tdo 1174/2004, and Resolution 4 T 98/2009 of the Regional Court in Brno.

Manifestations of prejudicial hatred can be traced to members or supporters of a wide range of political or other social entities. However, the Report mentions only those entities for whom such manifestations represent the dominant component of their rhetoric and activities. In practice, for example, there are groups where intolerant attacks against Roma, immigrants, Muslims, or homosexuals prevail. Another ideological program may be absent or only represent a complementary component.

In particular, individuals who have been the subject of criminal proceedings in connection with hate-motivated crime are mentioned in the Report.

Political categories (e.g., whether it is a neo-Nazi or neo-fascist entity) are not significant for the Ministry of the Interior. A crucial aspect is the spread of hatred arising from prejudice. It is the manifestations of hatred that pose an immediate threat for certain groups of people.

Two other groups are closely related to hate-expressing entities, namely **paramilitary and militia groups, and media spreading prejudicial hatred**. There is a symbiosis between them. Domestic militia entities took over the ideological starting points motivated by hatred and intolerance from the part of their xenophobically motivated personnel substrate. Media spreading prejudicial hatred, in turn, provide xenophobic-oriented individuals and entities an ample space. In some cases, they produce targeted reports based on disinformation and conspiracy theories for their xenophobic audience.

By introducing the concept of prejudicial hatred, the Ministry of the Interior also responds to the recommendations made by partner state institutions, academic experts, and the civilian sector.

**The anarchist and radically communist groups are included in the left-wing extremist spectrum.**

A chapter dedicated to **religiously motivated extremism** addresses hate speech ideologically based on **extremist interpretations** of different religions.

## 3. Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2018

### 3.1. Summary

**A significant role in the dissemination of racial, ethnic or religious hatred and intolerance played the movement Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura<sup>3</sup>. It overshadowed traditional right-wing extremists, whose importance gradually declined. The domestic militia also experienced stagnation. These entities do not represent an actual risk for democracy. Their current threat lies in possible individual excesses. From a long-term perspective, they weaken the democratic principles of the Czech Republic, damage its security guarantees, and reduce its social cohesion.**

**A symbiosis between xenophobic entities and the media spreading conspiracy theories and disinformation continued. Both spectra significantly helped to spread pro-Russian propaganda.**

**The Internet was filled with a range of hate speech by individuals who were not linked to any extremist scene.**

Left-wing extremists, anarchists, and radical communists participated in several smaller collectives that failed to reach the wider public.


**The police have accused several individuals of supporting or funding religiously motivated terrorism.**

In 2018, the Police of the Czech Republic **detected 179 criminal offences with an extremist subtext. There has been an increase in the number of prosecuted persons for offences with racial, national, and other hateful motives, totaling 177 persons. A total of 159 people were accused of these crimes in 2018. A total of 54 individuals were sentenced for offences with hateful motives.**

In 2018, **a total of 232 events organized by extremists or with their participation** were recorded. Out of these, 176 belonged to the extreme left spectrum and only 56 to the extreme right spectrum. Compared to 2017, a significant year-on-year decline can be observed (a total of 334 events in 2017 – 235 left-wing extremists and 99 right-wing extremists).

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<sup>3</sup> The Freedom and Direct Democracy Movement – Tomio Okamura is not considered extremist by the definition of the Ministry of the Interior. It belongs to the category entitled „Manifestations of prejudicial hatred“.



### **3.2. Right-wing extremists**

#### Political parties

Traditional right-wing extremist political parties concentrated on constant repetition of hate clichés that were complemented by the criticism of the European Union, NATO, or liberal democracy. Their representatives often talked about the alleged moral decline of Western civilization. However, they failed to establish new original topics.

The main entities, the **Workers' Party of Social Justice** („DSSS“) and the **National Democracy** („ND“) do not represent a direct threat to democracy. Their actual risk may be mainly seen in the excesses of individuals. From a long-term perspective, they can be perceived as a conscious or unconscious tool of influence of foreign states. They undermine the Czech Republic's security guarantees and disrupt its social cohesion.

The absence of a specific political program and any experts on the scale of creative human activity led to a **total fall of both parties in the October municipal elections**. Only individuals managed to gain chairs in municipal councils.

DSSS failed to react to its decreasing popularity. Despite a series of its political failures, **Tomáš Vandas once again became its chairman**. A long-term neo-Nazi activist Jiří Froněk gained the deputy chairman post. Its cells increased its autonomy compared to previous years. Significant activity was only recorded within organizations in Prague, Ústí nad Labem, Southern Bohemian, and Central Bohemian regions. Practically all organizationally more capable activists left the Workers' Youth. Martin Aubrecht became the new chairman of actually only a formally functioning youth group.

**More significant gatherings linked to DSSS were directed either against the Roma or against foreigners.** The August gathering in Dubí was a reaction to an interethnic incident at the local swimming pool. The November event in Litvínov was to commemorate the 10th anniversary of violence organized by neo-Nazis and football hooligans. Both events were attended by only about dozens of people, mostly older activists. Only violent behaviour of individuals or behaviour motivated by extreme ideologies gained attention. DSSS and ND, together with other entities, hosted the May Day gathering in Pilsen with the attendance of about 200 people. DSSS and ND, along with other entities, organized May Day gatherings in Pilsen with the attendance of 200 people. Both sides were able to find common ground in the West Bohemian metropolis. Their only topic was the alleged „rocket rise in crime“. Xenophobic speeches by Pilsen extremists have the support of some football rioters supporting Viktoria Pilsen football club.

DSSS maintained its contacts with the People's Party of Our Slovakia and National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – NPD). Its membership in the European political party Alliance for Peace and Freedom continued. These entities, despite the initial confusion within a part of their neo-Nazi personnel substrate, expressed support for the current regime in the Russian Federation and interpreted some ideas based on the Kremlin propaganda in their home countries.

The Supreme Court rejected the appeal of Petr Borna, who in the position of the DSSS candidate in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies disseminated anti-Roma leaflets. This politician was convicted of incitement of hatred against a group of people or restricting their rights and freedoms.

The ND party was paralyzed by a **series of court hearings with its chairman Adam Bartoš**. Courts have twice sentenced him to conditional sentences for hate crimes. In the first case, it was an anti-Semitic performance in Polná in the Jihlava district, in the second one, it was about publishing anti-Semitic books and other hate speech.

Bartoš further raised attention by participating in the International Economic Forum in Yalta, which was to legitimize the Russian annexation of Crimea. He also supported the International Congress of Peacekeeping Forces under the auspices of the Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. In February, the chairman of ND visited the Iranian Embassy. Bartoš also established close cooperation with the editor-in-chief of the Aeronet conspiracy web. With the „chief of the carousel“, as the editor-in-chief calls himself, was linked the presentation of anti-Semitic opinions, particularly the spread of quasi-theories about the Jewish conspiracy. ND Deputy Chairman Jan Sedláček compared the August terrorist attack on Czech soldiers in Afghanistan to the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich.

#### Other traditional right-wing extremist entities

A part of the former Workers' Youth activists and informal neo-Nazi groups joined together under the title **National and Social Front**. This organization is strongly focused on the international scene and seeks inspiration in neighbouring countries. Its members, for example, attended the November Independence march in Warsaw, also maintained friendly relations with their German and Italian colleagues.

**Generation of Identity** also emerged from the neo-Nazi and hooligan environment. Its activists consider themselves to be a part of a broader European identity movement. They

also have a long-term focus on international issues, such as the support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Despite the formal distancing from Hitler's Nazism or traditional neo-Nazism, they are characterized by continuous hate speech.

In 2018, a total of **11 White power music concerts** were organized. The most common performers were bands from Slovakia. Czech neo-Nazis also attended concerts abroad, particularly in Poland, Germany, and Hungary. A popular location for neo-Nazi concerts was the Saxon village of Ostritz, near the Czech-Polish-German border. Accompanying activities of music festival were the organization of combat tournaments between neo-Nazi or racist fighters. These combat tournaments are also associated with the distribution of thematic clothing brands, which are intended for supporters of the neo-Nazi movement.

Several **incidents caused by neo-Nazi or racist hooligans** were also recorded in the monitored period. The dangers of these, often trained and experienced, violent individuals can be seen in targeting people outside the hooligan environment who do not expect such violent behaviour, they are not prepared for it, or cannot protect themselves. Neo-Nazi or xenophobic hooligan camps are prevalent in the Czech Republic. For example, the hooligans of the Sigma Olomouc football club are violent and racist in the long-term.

The Constitutional Court dismissed a complaint of Tomáš Kopecký's, who was sentenced for an arson attack on a Roma accommodation facility in Aš. The Court did not believe his claim that he „only“ wanted to scare its inhabitants.

### ***3.3. Manifestations of prejudicial hatred***

Manifestations of hatred are no longer the domain of traditional extremists. They are also used by some other populist and excessively nationalistic entities. The most considerable part of the agenda of these groups, similarly to DSSS or ND, involves creating and encouraging intolerance towards other groups of Czech society. They often mistakenly believe that by formally distancing themselves from racism and extremism, or by publishing their opinions in an anonymous Internet environment, they are relieved of their responsibility for their actions. Their current level of risk lies in possible individual excesses, and in the long-term, they weaken democracy and social cohesion in the Czech Republic.

From the perspective of the Ministry of the Interior, as well as the intelligence services and law enforcement authorities, political research, whether a particular entity fulfills the defining features of extremist ideology is less substantial. Assessment of its hateful or intolerant presentation is far more significant. From the legal point of view, it should be emphasized that criminal offences motivated by hatred may also be committed by individuals, who are not members or supporters of an extremist movement. Manifestations of intolerance are also committed by individuals with no proven link to xenophobically oriented groups.

#### Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura

The **most influential actor** in the area of spreading religious or ethnic intolerance is the **Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura** („SPD“). Some of its members

were very active in spreading information directed against Muslims, immigrants or Roma<sup>4</sup>. SPD deliberately targets groups of people whom it assumes that they will not submit the manipulative information a critical reflection.

There were also records of anti-Roma speeches by Tomio Okamura and some of his colleagues. During the year, the police investigated, and later postponed, a criminal complaint against three Members of the Parliament from the SPD – Tomio Okamura, Radek Rozvorál and Miroslav Rozner – for their statements about the camp in Lety by Písek. The Prague Public Prosecutor's Office, nevertheless, returned the case of **Rozner** to the detectives. **Prague police officers subsequently requested the Chamber of Deputies to waive the immunity of this politician.** The case has already come to the Mandate and Immunity Committee, but it had not yet been decided in 2018<sup>5</sup>. These statements have provoked a very negative response among people who have personal experiences with the Holocaust.

The North Moravian SPD warned against the civic sector and described its representatives as „traitors“, who were supposed to be preparing a „Czech Maidan“.

In 2018, **criminal proceedings with Jaroslav Balda**, who cut trees on railway tracks in Central Bohemia in two cases were carried out. He aimed to attribute these acts to alleged Islamist terrorists and to influence public opinion against the Muslim community. The perpetrator was a very active supporter and follower of the SPD, as well as a frequent reader of media spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories.

#### Other entities

During the refugee crisis, several groups, bringing together diverse personalities who raised diverse, often disparate topics (e.g., the issue of execution, conspiracy theories, etc.). The only connecting elements were resistance to immigrants or Muslims, and criticism of the allegedly declining Western civilization. Its members first socialized on social networks on the Internet, then transferred their activities to real life. Some have established friendly relationships with traditional extremists or supported the SPD. Honour, Freedom and Respect, and Hey, Citizen may be included in this spectrum.

The importance of these entities declined in 2018. With the exhaustion of the topic of migration, the mobilization potential has disappeared, and personal animosity started to emerge.

The ideas of panslavism or the promotion of Slavic reciprocity with the dominant role of the Russian Federation also penetrated these groups. Various ideological concepts emerged on this subject. So far, they have not found a great response in the Czech Republic; however, they could gain supporters in the future, especially among young people.

#### Individual manifestations of hatred

As in previous years, it was possible to register, particularly in the virtual environment, a wide range of hate speech addresses to, among others, Roma, Muslims,

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<sup>4</sup> Social media, especially Facebook, has become a tool for regular distribution of such content.

<sup>5</sup> In 2019, the Mandate and Immunity Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic first did not recommend the waiver of immunity of this MP. The Chamber of Deputies then decided not to extradite him for criminal prosecution.

immigrants or representatives of the civil sector. **A part of the Czech society remains convinced that the Internet environment is anonymous to a great extent. Some authors of hate texts believe that criminal liability applies only to members of extremist movements (e.g., neo-Nazis) or that formal distancing from extremism or racism is the basis for their impunity.** The current practice of law enforcement authorities refutes this false presumption. For the purpose of prevention, The Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office provided several examples of behaviour that was considered criminal by the prosecutor's offices or courts.

A public prosecutor of the District Public Prosecutor's Office for Prague 1 filed an indictment against J. S. for offences of instigation to hatred against a group of people or restriction of their rights and freedoms under Section 356 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code, and denial, questioning, approval, and justification of genocide under Section 405 of the Criminal Code on 18 July 2018. The defendant allegedly shouted in front of several people that *„gays and lesbians are ill, they should be shot right after their birth“* and *„gays, Jews, and Roma should all end up in a gas chamber“* in a restaurant of the Chamber of Deputies on 24 October 2017.

A public prosecutor of the District Public Prosecutor's Office for Prague 6 filed an indictment against P. H. for an offence of instigation to hatred against a group of people or restriction of their rights and freedoms under Section 356 paragraphs 1, 3 point a) of the Criminal Code on 15 October 2018. The defendant allegedly posted a comment in a Facebook discussion under a photograph of a newborn I. K. stating that *„It is a waste, it's in his genes. He will only continue to reproduce others. How many offsprings will he have in 25 years? So as for me, jump on his neck“*.

By a criminal order of the District Court in Karviná dated 26 November 2018, the accused L. G. was found guilty of committing an offence of denial, questioning, approval, and justification of genocide under Section 405 of the Criminal Code. The defendant wrote a text *„Gypsies, do you live well from our taxes? Hitler on you, you black bitches“* on a wall of an elevator on 13 October 2018. He was fined 20.000 CZK.

By a resolution of the public prosecutor of the District Public Prosecutor's Office in Mladá Boleslav dated 25 May 2018, which entered into force on 5 June 2018, the criminal prosecution of the accused P. D. for an offence of instigation to hatred against a group of people or restriction of their rights and freedoms under Section 356 paragraphs 1, 3 point a) of the Criminal Code was conditionally suspended. The defendant allegedly posted a comment in a discussion under an article about Iranian refugees that *„They should have killed that family, what the fuck. Some Muslim, who cares? Shoot them one by one“*. He was given a trial period of six months.

By a resolution of the public prosecutor of the District Public Prosecutor's Office in Chomutov dated 15 May 2018, which entered into force on 22 May 2018, the criminal prosecution of the accused M. R. for a criminal offence of instigation to hatred against a group of people or restriction of their rights and freedoms under Section 356 paragraphs 1, 3 point a) of the Criminal Code, was conditionally suspended. The defendant allegedly posted a

comment in a discussion under the article entitled „The Police stopped two trucks with refugees on D5“ stating that „*I would burn both children and parents. They are all parasitic swine. These little bastards will become terrorists anyway*“. He was given a trial period of one year.

By a resolution of the District Court for Prague 1 dated 10 April 2018, which entered into force on 14 April 2018, the criminal prosecution of the accused C. N. for a criminal offence of defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other group under Section 355 paragraph 1 point b) of the Criminal Code, was conditionally suspended. The defendant allegedly posted a comment in a Facebook discussion stating that „*Gypsies are like jellyfish - poisonous and useless*“. He was given a trial period of one year.

On 12 June 2018, a public prosecutor of the District Public Prosecutor's Office for Prague 6 filed an indictment against three accused Š. Č., T. S., and J. U. for a criminal offence of bodily harm under Section 146 paragraphs 1, 21 point e), paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code, and an offence of defamation of nation, race, ethnic or other group under Section 355 paragraph 1 point a), paragraph 2 point a) of the Criminal Code. On 4 November 2017, the defendants allegedly attacked XY in a tram, shouted at him that he was a black mouth, that he should return to Africa, and that he was a dirty negro. They also squeezed lemons on him, punched and kicked his head and chest. The victim was subsequently treated at a surgical clinic and developed post-traumatic stress disorder.

### **3.4. Paramilitary and domestic militia**

The activity of these groups on a national level stagnated. Only local groups were active.

**Land Militia**, founded by former dissatisfied members of the National Militia, organized several local exercises, particularly in the Central Bohemian region, and one more extensive exercise entitled Autumn 2018. Its cells are often formed by individuals of the retirement or pre-retirement age.

Most militia activities only took place in a virtual environment. Similarly to, for example, DSSS or ND, militia on the Internet artificially exaggerate its significance.

As with other hate-oriented entities, even in the case of militia, personal animosities and disagreements over future direction appeared. Some militia representatives were blamed for focusing solely on their ambitions or for their primary intention to generate profit instead of patriotism within these entities.

In addition to xenophobic thoughts, conspiracy theories and disinformation were often disseminated by militia groups. The militia contributed to the spread of pro-Russian propaganda. Some of their members tried to create a false impression that there is a threat of

an armed conflict between the „West“ and the Russian Federation, which could escalate to World War III.

Some regional branches made efforts to establish cooperation with local state institutions. In this case, they purposefully deferred their real ideological background. **They participated in organizing awareness-raising events or military training days.** The militia groups mentioned above are inherently xenophobic, racist, and they reject the foreign policy direction of the state. **Therefore, a possible realization of these projects can be considered a significant security risk.**

### **3.5. Anarchist scene**

**There were no records of violent direct actions as regards the militant anarchists.** Radical speeches were only presented on the Internet.

On 27 March, the High Court in Prague lawfully acquitted a group of anarchists who were accused of preparing a terrorist attack on a train with military material, when it dismissed the public prosecutor's appeal against the judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague from 2017.

The member base of anarchist groups remained weak. Some activists attempted to change the ongoing fragmentation by setting up **Kolektiv 115** (K115) platform in August. Even though K115 organized most of the public events during the second half of the year, it did not lead to the unification of the scene.

Other active groups were the **Anarchist Federation** or the Anarchist Black Cross platform. Antifascist Action was active minimally and concentrated on monitoring of its ideological opponents on the Internet.

Clashes with traditional right-wing extremists have ceased, with rare anarchist protests focusing solely on the SPD.

In 2018, public events of the anarchist spectrum withdrew in favour of various concerts, happenings or solidarity actions focused on the scene inside of the movement.

In addition to manifestations of solidarity with colleagues targeted by authorities, anarchists **also supported the Kurds.** They participated in protests against the arrest of Salih Muslim, expressed support to the Kurdish militia as well as the Rojava region. In December, activists of the newly established Committee on the Protection of the Revolution in Rojava, whose members are also anarchists, threw smoke bombs in front of a building belonging to the Turkish Embassy. This region is becoming a new Chiapas for anarchists around the world, a place where anti-authoritarian ideas are applied in practice.

The dominant theme for the anarchists was the **support of squatting.** Despite the decision of the Supreme Court, and subsequently the Constitutional Court, they did not want

to give up occupation of the Autonomous Social Centre Klinika in Žižkov, Prague. In February, they temporarily occupied Šatovka homestead in Prague.

Anarchists also included **environmental topics** to their portfolio. Similarly to 2017, they attended the Klimakemp, where several activists broke into the Bílina mine and attached themselves to the excavator. They also participated in a similar action in Germany entitled Ende Gelände, whose aim is to fight against the expansion of the brown coal mine Hambach. The participation of anarchist elements in these actions reduces their legitimacy in the eyes of many authorities.

### ***3.6. Radical communist scene***

Radical communists were fragmented into several collectives with a small membership base. They focused on domestic issues somewhat marginally, mostly commenting on international events. Their rhetoric was reminiscent of the normalization period.

Some activists expressed support for the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine. They often inclined toward adoration of the Russian Federation and condemnation of Ukraine and the North Atlantic Alliance. A part of the radical communist scene expressed uncritical admiration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as a state that firmly adheres to the strict communist line.

The **Communist Youth Union** and the **Left Perspective** are among the more active entities. The Regional Court in Brno has abolished the Young Communist Union of Czechoslovakia because it did not substantiate the legal reason for using premises it has registered as its headquarters.

It was possible to detect cooperation between these entities and the representatives of a radical wing of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the monitored period.

### ***3.7. Media spreading prejudicial hatred***

Media projects that operate with a targeted spread of conspiracy theories and disinformation have made a significant **contribution to the spread of racist and xenophobic ideas**. These media undermine democratic principles and weaken social cohesion in the Czech Republic. Some projects can be described as rather commercial. In such cases, they tend to copy articles, present a range of advertisements, and request contributions intensively. Alongside these media, some media create their narratives, conspiracy theories, or disinformation, and they do not include advertising. Some media have become „press bodies“ of extremists or populist entities. In such a case, they give space to their representatives, comment positively on the cases associated with them, or promote their activities. They adopt their hateful ideas, multiply them, and attempt to create a legitimate political topic. A typical example is a cooperation between Aeronet Editor-in-Chief and ND Chairman Adam B. Bartoš.

In the virtual environment, a large number of groups of people emerged and shared these media products and discussed their content. For those who do not critically assess these outputs, they can create feelings of panic, fear, or threat. This process was well documented in the criminal proceedings with Jaromír Balda.

In order to gain more audience, the „journalists“ of these projects have created new Facebook groups that multiply the output of these media. It is an inexpensive and efficient process that is easy to maintain.

These media resort to some bipolar vision of the world. Frequently used topics are illustrated in the following table:

Rotten „West“	Perspective Russian Federation
Corrupt national elites	Celebrating the current regime
„Dictate of Brussels“	Government of a solid hand
„Dictate of Washington“	Ability to resist immigration
Aggressive NATO	Defender of Christian traditions
Reborn power appetite of Germany	Defender of conservative values
International Conspiracy (secret transnational agreements)	Concept of pan-Slavism – escalated nationalism
Inability to defend against Muslims	Barrier against Nazism
Inability to defend against immigrants	Strong entity that successfully resists attacks from the outside
Inability to defend against parasitic Roma	Just and effective foreign policy
Jewish conspiracy	
The decline of the family	
Sexual deviation	
Lying official or serious media	
Support for „Nazi“ Ukraine	
Striving for new „Maidans“	
Corrupt and incompetent human rights activists and non-profit organizations	

Topics are varied, and it does not matter that their combinations may seem illogical or contradictory. One example is the fear of the danger of Nazism on the one hand and the spread of anti-Semitic clichés on the other. Articles often preset only opinions without facts. The information presented does not have to be correct at all or are true only partly. Typically, for example, false reports about the presence of groups of illegal immigrants can be mentioned. Sometimes the editors change their attitude and not bother readers to justify it.

It is a potent mechanism that regularly floods public space with new messages. Long-term content analysis suggests that these media often do not follow a unified information line, but merely generate information chaos. The result is the eradication of rational discussion through arguments and its replacement with emotional conspiracy controversies.

The range of these media operating in the Czech Republic is quite extensive. On the scale, an anti-Semitic Aeronet can be found at one end, trying to raise new conspiracy theories, and the Patriotic Newspaper, which predominantly repeats the news from other sites and gives them a primitive racist character, can be found at the other end.

A total of 11 criminal complaints or findings related to content posted through these websites were investigated last year. Most frequently, the content concerned suspicion of spreading alarming news (Section 357 CC), defamation of a nation, race or another group of persons (Section 355 CC) and incitement to hatred against a group of people (Section 356 CC). **Even those who spread such content among other residents, such as through virtual social networks or chain e-mail messages, can commit these offences.**

### ***3.8. Religiously motivated extremism***

The Police **accused former Prague imam Samer Shehadeh** from the criminal offence of financing and support and promotion of terrorism. This person was escorted from to the Czech Republic from Jordan in November. In addition to Samer Shehadeh, his brother and his wife, a Czech convert to Islam, were also charged. The couple also faces allegations of membership in the Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. An international arrest warrant was issued for the couple.

Another person was accused of financing terrorism in a different case. This was supposed to be alleged support of the Islamic State.

**Criminal proceedings were conducted with the Slovak convert to Islam, Dominik Kobulnický**, accused by the public prosecutor of preparing a terrorist attack and of an offence of establishing supporting and promoting a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms.

The security forces consider the biggest challenge to be **lonely wolves**, where there are no links to terrorist organizations, even if they claim membership to one of them after a terrorist attack.

During the year, **three terrorist attacks in Afghanistan affected** Czech soldiers. As a result of the 5 August attack, three people died. Attack from 17 October claimed a total of five wounded persons. One Czech soldier was killed, and the other two were injured after another incident of 22 October. These events have received a great response in the Czech Republic. There were also cases where these attacks were approved. The Police have so far accused two people of supporting and promoting terrorism. In one case, it was a poster placement, and the other referred to Internet content. An investigation was carried out in other cases.

In May, the Municipal Court dismissed the prosecutor's appeal in the case of the publication of *The Fundamentals of Tawheed* by Bilal Philips. The case was associated with extensive raids in Prague's Muslim centres in 2014. The Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office then appealed to the Supreme Court in this case.

In October, the Security Information Service reported that, together with its foreign partners **uncovered, analyzed and eventually initiated the shutdown of a network of hacker servers** in the territory of the Czech Republic. According to the Security Information Service, the **militant Hezbollah movement** is almost certainly behind the operation of servers with the aim of cyberespionage. Attacks targeting mobile devices have abused false profiles of attractive girls on Facebook.

With respect to the ending war conflict with the Islamic State, the transfer of Islamic State fighters or their relatives to the European continent can be predicted. They may pose a security risk in terms of possible radicalization or preparation of a terrorist attack.

The Police of the Czech Republic has registered **a total of 16 persons linked to the Czech Republic, who are suspected of being the so-called foreign fighters**. Four of them are citizens of the Czech Republic, others had some form of stay or have some relatives in the Czech Republic. Five of them have been charged (one person is in custody, four are on the run). One person is in prison. Three people are believed to have died.

In several cases, the security forces have detected movements of individuals linked to international terrorism across the Czech Republic. Relevant knowledge is regularly shared with foreign partners.

The Czech Republic reopened the honorary consulate in Jerusalem in May, then in the same town the Czech House in November. President Miloš Zeman said in a speech in Knesset in Israel that he wished to move the Czech Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. These acts associated with Jerusalem are of great symbolic significance and are perceived sensitively in the Muslim world.

In the course of the year, the first degree of the terrorist threat was applied.

### ***3.9. Statistics of criminal activity with an extremist subtext***

#### **3.9.1. Introduction**

Police statistics are processed on the basis of the **Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium** (Evidenčně statistický systém kriminality Policejního prezidia, ESKK). **Statistical data of the Ministry of Justice, which also form the basis for the statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, are processed on a different timeframe than police statistics.** For them, the decisive element is not the time when a crime has been committed, but rather the time when a public prosecutor prepared the indictment, decided on the cessation of the prosecution, etc. The absence of any interconnectedness of these three statistics is a significant handicap; however, it is technically impossible to solve this issue at present.

Before 2009, police statistics were governed by Act No. 36/1960 Coll., on the Territorial Division of the State, as amended. Therefore, statistics formerly distinguished between 7 regions and Prague. Since 1 January 2010, statistics are broken down identically to higher territorial units, and therefore distinguish between 14 regions. This change complicates year on year comparisons of regional data before and after 2009.

The Statistical Recording System of Crime was developed in the 1970s. Recently, many of its indicators have been found obsolete and inadequate. Therefore, **a major reconstruction of this system was initiated** in 2016. The reconstruction aims to bring the data up to date with current conditions, refine them, simplify their calculation, and make them accessible to the general public in a more comprehensible and approachable form.

This reconstruction involves a **transition to different software. The manner of data flow from the information system of Evidence of Criminal Proceedings to the ESSK is also being changed.** Algorithms calculating statistical numbers are also being reviewed. The reconstruction, assessment, and modification of the system are taking place during its full operation and are continuously fine-tuned. The result of this reconstruction in its final form will be the incompatibility of the data with the previous period, especially as regards the indicators of the number of prosecuted persons and criminal offences committed by them.

**There has been a fundamental change in the counting system of prosecuted persons.** In the past, only the most serious criminal activity was attributed to the prosecuted person. If under one reference number, the perpetrator committed murder as well as negligence of mandatory support, they were counted only as a person prosecuted for murder. Currently, all criminal activities will be taken into account when counting the number of prosecuted persons. Statistically, this will manifest as a difference between the number of offenders for the total number of criminal offences, and the sum of the number of offenders by individual types of criminal offences. **One perpetrator will be counted as many times as the number of criminal offences they committed.**

In the past, statistics on crimes committed by police officers were processed by the Inspectorate of the Police of the Czech Republic, which was replaced by the General Inspectorate of Security Forces as of 1 January 2012. Therefore, data from 2011 is provided by General Inspectorate.

Within the non-standard statistical outcomes, the Police of the Czech Republic have been processing statistics related to detected criminal offences with anti-Semitic subtext since 2005<sup>6</sup>. As of 1 January 2005, the classification of extremist criminal offences in the Statistical Recording System of Crime was extended to include codes allowing for the identification of crimes motivated by religious and ethnic hatred against Jews and the Jewish fate, including attacks against Jewish Community edifices and their facilities, synagogues, and Jewish cemeteries.

Since 2011, the reports include several criminal offences motivated by hatred against the Roma. It is necessary to add an explanatory commentary to these statistics. Police statistics do not distinguish victims of crime according to their ethnicity or nationality. It is only possible to detect that the victim was a foreigner. On the other hand, criminal offences motivated by racial hatred or hatred against Bohemians, Moravians, and Silesians, Polish, Germans, Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Hungarians, Russians and Ruthenians, Roma, Jews, Arabs, Chinese, and other nationalities, are recorded in the Statistical Recording System of Crime. For a criminal offence motivated by hatred against Roma to be recorded in the police statistics, the following conditions must be met: 1) the police officers must evaluate the act as a criminal offence with an extremist subtext when filling out the relevant form, 2) victims must clearly state that they are a Roma or that the criminal offence was committed against an object with apparent ties to the Roma ethnicity (e.g., spraying of a racist inscription on a Roma Holocaust memorial, or a museum of Roma culture, etc.). Therefore, crimes against the Roma are not included in police statistics when an anti-Roma subtext has not been proven (e.g., a car-theft when the perpetrator does not know the ethnic origins of its owner). Besides, many Roma individuals do not avow their Roma ethnicity in the Czech Republic. These statistics are, therefore, only indicative and have limited predictive value.

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<sup>6</sup> Prior to this extension of statistics, there was an increase in crimes with an anti-Semitic context throughout Europe. Anti-Semitism has become a priority topic for both the European Union and international organizations.

Police statistics are built solely for year-on-year comparison, not a month-on-month one. The calculations and comparisons are always carried out from 1 January until the end of the monitored period. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain the numbers for individual months. Given that the criminal proceedings are an ongoing process, a simple subtraction of consecutive periods would produce an imaginary number which could, under certain circumstances, have a negative value.

The total number of prosecuted persons does not represent the sum of values since one person may commit criminal offences in several regions, as well as several offences, and would be counted several times. This practice is valid as of 2016.

### 3.9.2. National statistics

For the following statistical evaluation, acts with an extremist subtext included cases of selected tactical-statistical classifications marked as having signs of extremism.

There were 192.405 criminal offences committed in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2018. Offences with extremist subtext accounted for 0.09% of the total. In 2018, the Police of the Czech Republic **detected 179 criminal offences with extremist subtext. In a year-on-year comparison, the number of detected extremist offences increased by 26.**

Of the above-mentioned criminal offences, **59.8% were solved, i.e., 107** (66.7% in 2017, i.e., 102 criminal offences).

In 2018, there was a total of **136 persons prosecuted** for offences with extremist subtext.

#### The total amount of criminal offences with extremist subtext recorded in the territory of the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2017

Year	Recorded Criminal Offences	Share in Total Crime Figures (%)	Solved Criminal Offences	Prosecuted and Investigated Persons
2006	248	0,07	196	242
2007	196	0,05	119	181
2008	217	0,06	126	195
2009	265	0,08	186	293
2010	252	0,08	168	231
2011	238	0,08	157	246
2012	173	0,06	116	208
2013	211	0,06	144	198
2014	201	0,07	132	157
2015	175	0,07	114	154

<b>2016</b>	143	0,07	99	x
<b>2017</b>	153	0,08	102	132
<b>2018</b>	179	0,09	107	136

Source: PCR, 2017

### 3.9.3. Regional statistics

#### Number of criminal offences

Region	Period 1 January – 31 October 2018		Period 1 January – 30 November 2018		Period 1 January – 31 December 2018	
	recorded	solved	recorded	solved	recorded	solved
Prague	41	16	44	19	51	20
Central Bohemian	15	8	17	10	17	10
Southern Bohemian	12	6	14	7	12	8
Pilsen	16	10	18	13	18	13
Ústí nad Labem	25	16	28	20	29	22
Hradec Králové	6	6	6	6	6	6
Southern Moravian	12	4	12	4	12	5
Moravian-Silesian	13	9	14	10	14	10
Olomouc	2	1	4	1	5	1
Zlín	5	4	5	4	5	5
Vysočina	3	3	3	3	3	3
Pardubice	2	1	2	1	1	1
Liberec	5	3	5	3	5	3
Carlsbad	1	0	1	0	1	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>107</b>

#### Number of prosecuted persons

Region	Period 1 January – 31 October 2018	Period 1 January – 30 November 2018	Period 1 January – 31 December 2018
	Number	Number	Number
Prague	29	33	34
Central Bohemian	8	9	9
Southern Bohemian	7	9	10

Pilsen	12	15	15
Ústí nad Labem	22	26	28
Hradec Králové	6	6	6
Southern Moravian	3	3	4
Moravian-Silesian	13	14	14
Olomouc	2	2	2
Zlín	6	6	7
Vysočina	3	3	3
Pardubice	1	1	1
Liberec	3	3	3
Carlsbad	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>136</b>

In 2018, the most offences with extremist subtext were registered in Prague (51), Ústí nad Labem region (29), and Pilsen region (18). The most prosecuted persons for offences with extremist subtext were recorded in Prague (34) and Ústí nad Labem (28).

### 3.9.4. Statistics by acts

#### Number of offences

Tactical-statistical classification	1 January – 31 October 2018		1 January – 30 November 2018		1 January – 31 December 2018	
	registered	solved	registered	solved	registered	solved
Intended Bodily Harm (Sections 145 - 146a)	7	3	7	3	7	4
Violence Against Group of People and Individuals (Section 352)	24	15	28	18	29	19
Dangerous Threatening (Section 353)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Damage to a Thing of Another (Section 228)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Disorderly Conduct at sports and public events (Section 358)	7	7	7	7	7	7
Spraying (Section 228/2)	2	1	3	1	3	1
Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group of People (Section 355)	33	13	33	15	36	15
Incitement to Ethnic and Racial Hatred (Section 356) (Section 356)	20	12	22	14	25	15

Support and Promotion of a Movement (Sections 403, 404, 405)	65	36	73	43	72	46
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>107</b>

### Number of prosecuted persons

Tactical-statistical classification	1.1.- 31.10.2018	1.1.- 30.11.2018	1.1.- 31.12.2018
	number	number	number
Intended Bodily Harm (Sections 145 - 146a)	6	6	7
Violence Against Group of People and Individuals (Section 352)	22	26	27
Dangerous Threatening (Section 353)	0	0	0
Damage to a Thing of Another (Section 228)	0	0	0
Disorderly Conduct at sports and public events (Section 358)	12	12	12
Spraying (Section 228/2)	1	1	1
Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group of People (Section 355)	21	23	23
Incitement to Ethnic and Racial Hatred (Section 356)	20	22	23
Support and Promotion of a Movement (Sections 403, 404, 405)	42	49	52
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>136</b>

In 2018, the most frequent criminal offences in the tactical-statistical group were „support and promotion of a movement“ (Sections 403, 404, 405), i.e., 72 acts.

The most prosecuted persons, i.e., 52, were recorded in the tactical-statistical group „support and promotion of a movement“ (Sections 403, 404, 405).

### 3.9.5. Crimes motivated by hatred against selected groups

**In 2018, there were 15 crimes with anti-Semitic subtext registered.** Compared to 2017, there was a decrease of 12 acts.

Criminal offences with an anti-Semitic context in 2018 accounted for 8,4 % of the total number of crimes having an extremist context. In 2017, it was 17,6 %.

**In 2018, a total of 36 crimes motivated by hatred against Roma were recorded. It is an increase of nine acts compared to last year.** These crimes accounted for 20,1 % of the total number of crimes with an extremist context in 2018.

In 2018, the Czech Police recorded eight **crimes motivated by hatred towards Muslims**. In 2017, they registered three. In the same year, the Czech Police also recorded

seven crimes motivated by hatred against the Arabs. Compared to 2017, it is an increase of five acts.

### 3.9.6. Criminal offences committed by members of Security Forces

Just as in between 2013 and 2017, no member or employee of security forces was accused of criminal offences with an extremist subtext in 2018.

### 3.9.7. Criminal offences committed by members of the Army of the Czech Republic

The Military Police did not record any case of illegal behaviour with an extremist subtext that would result in criminal proceedings under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

There were no manifestations of right-wing extremism within the Army of the Czech Republic. The Military Intelligence did not register relevant activities of left-wing extremists or anarchists directed against the Ministry of Defence. For the time being, the activities of domestic paramilitary groups do not indicate the transfer of military capabilities beyond the control of the Ministry of Defence.

### 3.9.8. Court statistics

In 2018, the Czech courts sentenced a total of 54.488 persons (55.069 in 2017, 61.399 in 2016, 65.569 in 2015, 72.854 in 2014, 77.976 in 2013, 71.471 in 2012, 70.160, in 2011, 69.953 in 2010, 73.752 in 2009), which represents a decrease of 581 persons, i.e. 1,06 %, compared to 2017. A total of **54 persons were convicted** for criminal offences with a **racial subtext** in 2018. This figure represents only 0,099 % of the total number of convicted persons this year.

Compared to 2017, we have seen an increase in the number of convicted offenders for offence with a racial subtext (by 7 persons, i.e. by approximately 14,9 %; 47 persons in 2017, 77 persons in 2016, 54 persons in 2015, 52 persons in 2014, 71 persons in 2013, 83 persons in 2012, 111 persons in 2011, 96 persons in 2010, 103 persons in 2009). From the given data, it is clear that the proportion of these offences in the total number of convicted persons in the Czech Republic remains very low. In absolute numbers, between 50 and 100 perpetrators have been oscillating in the last eight years.

The offenders were convicted of the following crimes in 2018<sup>7</sup>:

Criminal Offence	Provision of the Criminal Code (CC)	Number of Persons
		2018, (CC 40/2009)
Bodily Harm	Section 146	1
Fight	Section 158	1

<sup>7</sup> The sum is greater than 54 because one person can (and often is) convicted of multiple crimes.

Breaking and Entering	Section 178	2
Damage to a Thing of Another	Section 228	4
Threatening with Intention to Affect Public Official	Section 326	1
Violence against Group of People and Individuals	Section 352	10
Dangerous Threatening	Section 353	3
Dangerous Pursuing	Section 354	2
Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People	Section 355	13
Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or Suppression their Rights and Freedoms	Section 356	11
Disorderly Conduct	Section 358	19
Approval of Criminal Offence	Section 365	2
Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms	Section 404	25
Denial, Impugnation, Approval, and Justification of Genocide	Section 405	6

In 2018, the perpetrators of these offences were **most often sentenced for a criminal offence of expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms** under Section 404 CC – a total of 25 persons. They are followed by convictions for a criminal offence under Section 355 CC – defamation of a nation, ethnic group, race, and belief – a total of 27 persons. The third most frequent offence is rioting committed with racial subtext under Section 359 CC – 19 persons.

For given criminal offences with racial subtexts, **one person was sentenced to an unconditional sentence of between one to five years**. Of the convicted persons for **crimes with a racial subtext**, **three** have been identified as **recidivists** by courts. In 2018, **38 persons** were sentenced to **imprisonment with a conditional postponement**. The punishment of **community service was imposed in five cases**. One juvenile offender and two women were convicted.

### 3.9.9. Statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office

#### Overview of criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic, and other hatred between 2008 and 2018

<b>Criminal Offences Motivated by Racial, Ethnic, and Other Hatred</b>	<b>Persons Prosecuted</b> (figures in brackets indicate shortened preliminary criminal proceedings)	<b>Persons Accused</b> (figures in brackets indicate shortened preliminary criminal proceedings)
2008	200 (+41)	185 (+40)
2009	194 (+34)	183 (+32)
2010	225 (+63)	213 (+58)
2011	218 (+66)	209 (+59)
2012	224 (+65)	213 (+61)
2013	120 (+81)	115 (+77)
2014	139 (+45)	129 (+43)

2015	130 (+29)	115 (+22)
2016	95 (+33)	92 (+30)
2017	98 (+31)	90 (+29)
2018	144 (+33)	128 (+31)

In 2018, there was an **increase in the number of prosecuted persons for offences committed with racial, national, and other hateful motives, totaling 177 persons** (+48 compared to 2017, +49 compared to 2016). In 2018, a total of 159 persons were charged with these crimes (+40 compared to 2017, +37 compared to 2016).

In 2018, a total of 38 persons were prosecuted in the Czech Republic (38.415 persons in the case of shortened preliminary proceedings). A total of 33.832 persons were charged in 2018 (36.133 were filed for punishment). The proportion of prosecuted persons (+pre-trial proceedings) for crimes committed with racial, national and other hate motives on the total of prosecuted persons (+ shortened preliminary proceedings) was 0,231 %. **In the case of accused persons (+ files for punishment) of crimes committed with racial, national and other hate motives to the total number of accused persons (+ files for punishment), the contribution was 0,227%.**

The proportion of crimes committed from racial, national, or other hateful motives in the total amount of crime was still minimal in 2018. Yet, this type of crime should not be underestimated. Law enforcement authorities should focus in particular on rigorous punishment of hate speech on the Internet and social networks.

### **Persons prosecuted and accused of having committed offences motivated by racial, ethnic, and other hatred between 1995 and 2018**

CZ	Sec. 196/2 old CC		Sec 196/3 old CC		Sec 198 old CC		Sec 198a old CC		Sec 219/2g old CC		Sec 221/2b old CC	
	Sec 352/2 CC		Sec 352/3 CC		Sec 355 CC		Sec 356 CC		Sec 140/3g CC		Sec 146/2e CC	
	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused
2008	31	30	0	0	36	35	7	7	1	1	5	5
2009	33	32	6	6	19	19	7	4	0	0	19	19
2010	46	44	40	37	39	38	6	4	0	0	7	7
2011	41	39	38	37	35	35	5	5	1	1	17	16
2012	41	40	29	28	34	31	8	7	0	0	23	22
2013	15	15	5	5	27	25	2	2	0	0	21	21
2014	13	12	3	3	23	18	6	6	2	2	8	8
2015	17	15	5	5	25	24	4	3	0	0	6	5
2016	17	17	19	19	17	17	7	5	0	0	3	3

2017	10	8	3	3	10	9	6	5	0	0	13	12
2018	20	18	11	11	26	23	27	20	0	0	8	8

CZ	Sec 222/2b old CC Sec 145/2f CC		Sec 235/2f old CC Sec 175/2f CC		Sec 257/2b old CC Sec 228/3b CC		Sec 260 old CC Sec 403 CC		Sec 261 old CC Sec 404 CC		Sec 261a old CC Sec 405 CC	
	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused	Prosecuted	Accused
	2008	9	9	0	0	2	2	29	29	72	61	8
2009	21	21	0	0	1	1	25	24	66	60	4	4
2010	1	1	1	0	1	1	39	38	42	40	2	2
2011	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15	62	57	4	4
2012	2	2	2	2	1	0	27	27	52	49	5	5
2013	3	3	0	0	1	1	18	18	27	24	1	1
2014	3	3	1	1	3	3	15	15	57	53	5	5
2015	2	2	0	0	3	3	8	8	57	47	3	3
2016	1	1	0	0	3	3	0	0	27	26	1	1
2017	1	1	0	0	5	5	2	0	44	43	4	4
2018	1	1	3	3	2	2	6	6	31	28	9	8

Compared to 2017, the number of prosecuted and accused persons for crimes committed from racial, national, and other hateful motives increased in 2018 (see Table 1).

This increase was mainly due to the **criminal offence of instigation of hatred towards a group of people or suppression their rights and freedoms under Section 356 of the Criminal Code** (plus 21 prosecuted persons and plus 15 accused persons compared to 2017) and the **criminal offence of defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other group of people under Section 355 of the Criminal Code** (plus 16 prosecuted persons and plus 14 accused persons compared to 2017), **violence against group of people and individuals under Section 352 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code** (plus 10 prosecuted persons and plus 10 accused persons compared to 2017), and the **criminal offence of violence against group of people and individuals under Section 352 paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code** (plus eight prosecuted persons and plus eight accused persons in 2017).

A slight increase can also be seen in the **criminal offence of a denial, questioning, approving and justifying genocide under Section 405 of the Criminal Code** (plus five prosecuted persons and plus four accused persons compared to 2107), the **criminal offence of establishment, support and promotion of a movement seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms** (plus four prosecuted persons and plus 6 persons compared to 2017), and the **criminal offence of extortion under Section 175 paragraph 2 point f) of the Criminal Code** (plus three prosecuted persons and plus three accused persons compared to 2017).

Even though the **criminal offence of expressing sympathies for a movement seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms under Section 404 of the Criminal Code** has long been one of the most represented types of the criminal offence in the monitored category ( 31 prosecuted persons in 2018, 28 accused persons in 2018), there was a decrease in prosecuted persons (- 13) and accused persons (- 15) compared to 2017. However, this decline is counterbalanced by the increase in hate speech on the Internet and social networks.

A reduction in the number of prosecuted persons was also recorded in the case of the **criminal offence of bodily harm under Section 146 paragraph 2 point e) of the Criminal Code** (minus five persons compared to 2017) and several accused persons (minus four persons compared to 2017). A negligible decrease was also evident in the case of the **criminal offence of damage of a thing of another under Section 228 paragraph 3 point b) of the Criminal Code** (minus three prosecuted persons and minus three accused persons) in 2017.

The same values as in 2017 are recorded only for the **criminal offence of serious bodily harm under Section 145 paragraph 2 point f) of the Criminal Code** (one person was prosecuted, and one person was charged in 2018), and the **criminal offence of murder under Section 140 paragraph 3 point a) of the Criminal Code** (no person was prosecuted or charged).

**Summary of selected extremist, racially and xenophobically motivated crimes monitored in 2017 by the Criminal Proceedings Department of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office:**

As for crimes of an extremist and hateful character („hate crime“), it can be stated that similarly to last year, and according to the prosecutor's information, there were **no attacks with racial motives resulting in death**. The most frequent delinquencies in the area of extremism are cases of the so-called hailing, presentation of „defective“ symbols on clothing or their spraying on buildings, respectively public presentation of defective tattoos, hate speech on the Internet, racially motivated insults, etc.

It is possible to observe a **decrease in „pure“ promotion of extremist movements aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms, which is, however, balanced by the increase in hate speech on the Internet, especially on social networks.**

**Hate speech, which previously targeted the Roma in particular, partially shifted towards Muslims, migrants as well as persons favourable towards them.**

### **3.9.10. Statistics of the Probation and Mediation Service**

The aggregate number of files that the Probation and Mediation Service (PMS) has handled since its establishment shows that the share of PMS files related to crimes motivated by extremism remains low. Since 2002, these files account for 0.2 – 0.7% of the total number of newly registered files in a given year. **In 2018, the share of these case files on the total volume was 0.2% (the total of 26 363 files).** It represents the same share as in the previous year.

Offences with an extremist subtext in individual judicial regions between 2014 and 2018

soudní kraje	2014 celkem spisů	z toho s extrémisti ckým podtextem	2015 celkem spisů	z toho s extrémisti ckým podtextem	2016 celkem spisů	z toho s extrémisti ckým podtextem	2017 celkem spisů	z toho s extrémisti ckým podtextem	2018 celkem spisů	z toho s extrémisti ckým podtextem
Praha	2 593	12 (0,5%)	2841	13 (0,5%)	2748	8 (0,3%)	2523	6 (0,2%)	2 578	8 (0,3%)
Středočeský	3 793	5 (0,1%)	3604	6 (0,2%)	3539	8 (0,2%)	3268	4 (0,1%)	3 146	8 (0,3%)
Jihočeský	2 211	4 (0,2%)	2277	7 (0,3%)	2066	4 (0,2%)	1858	4 (0,2%)	1 737	1 (0,1%)
Západočeský	3 038	4 (0,1%)	3014	6 (0,2%)	2885	3 (0,1%)	2648	5 (0,2%)	2 649	9 (0,3%)
Severočeský	5 619	18 (0,3%)	5373	7 (0,1%)	5371	19 (0,4%)	5037	10 (0,2%)	4 751	12 (0,3%)
Východočeský	3 000	4 (0,1%)	2809	0 (0,0%)	2757	1 (0,0%)	2660	6 (0,2%)	2 584	4 (0,2%)
Jihomoravský	4 966	8 (0,2%)	4853	7 (0,1%)	4588	13 (0,3%)	4149	4 (0,1%)	3 836	8 (0,2%)
Severomoravský	6 317	4 (0,1%)	5965	11 (0,2%)	5833	4 (0,1%)	5576	7 (0,1%)	5 082	11 (0,2%)
celkem ČR	31 537	60 (0,25%)	30 736	57 (0,2%)	29787	60 (0,2%)	27719	46 (0,2%)	26 363	61 (0,2%)

Source: standard statistics and data export by PMS

In terms of criminal law classification, most of the files handled by the PMS in 2018 were related to the criminal offences of „Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms“ (Section 404 of the CC, 37%), „Violence against Group of People and Individuals“ (Section 352 of the CC, 23%), and „Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People“ (Section 355 of the CC, 23%). Other criminal offences (Sections 356, 403, and 405 of the CC) appeared in the PMS records minimally.

## 4. Foreign influence on the Czech Republic

### 4. 1. Right-wing extremism abroad with influence on the Czech Republic

**Alliance for Peace and Freedom („APF“)** was exempted by the Office for European Political Parties from its register because it did not comply with the amended conditions of registration under the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations. It had a similar impact of the **Europa Terra Nostra** foundation, which was unregistered from the European Political Foundations Register. Therefore, none of these entities can gain funds from the European budget. DSSS, whose chairman Tomáš Vandas attended the pan-European congress in Milan in May, is also a member of APF. French right-wing extremist **Jean Marie Le Pen** also joined the APF in March after being expelled from the National Front (Front National). Le Pen has also visited the Czech Republic in the past. In 2018, the Office for European Political Parties also unregistered another entity that had a partially right-wing extremist base – the **Alliance of European National Movements (AEMN)**. There are no representatives of the Czech Republic in this formation.

Traditionally, close relationships are maintained between Czech and Slovak right-wing extremists. It was also reflected in the cooperation between the DSSS and the party **Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia („L’SNS“)**. Its chairman Marián Kotleba spoke at a DSSS demonstration in Dubí on 18 August. In 2018, representatives of the L’SNS engaged in a project around the film **Lost Europe**, which seeks to mobilize opponents of existing European Union policy in Slovakia and abroad.

In 2018, activities of a paramilitary group Slovak Recruits aroused considerable controversy. Although they are not directly identified as extremist groups in the current official documents of the Slovak Republic, the Minister of Defence Peter Gajdoš filed a motion to the General Prosecutors Office to investigate the legality of their activities on 23 July. He later said that the activity of similar groups could cause an increase in extremism in the society. Slovak Recruits maintain friendly relationships with the controversial motorcycle club Night Wolves, which set up a base near Trnava. Representatives of the Slovak Recruits met with representatives of the **Land Militia** in the Czech Republic in April.

On 26 August, two men with a migration background (both Kurdish, one from Iraq and the other from Syria) attacked a German citizen of Cuban origin in **Chemnitz**, Germany. He died after the knife attack. In the following few weeks, the event caused a wave of mass anti-immigration protests, as well as anti-racist and anti-fascist protests. There was also controversy based on the information that there are hunts organized for foreigners in the city. A large part of the protesters were peaceful individuals without direct links to extremists, and members of the Alternative for Germany party („AfD“).

Nonetheless, members of extremist groups were also involved in the protests. There were also violent incidents. Several right-wing extremists and anti-Islamic activists from the Czech Republic participated in anti-immigration gatherings in a more or less organized manner. The events in Chemnitz have often been reflected in the domestic media that spread disinformation and conspiracy theories. Czech left-wing extremists participated in anti-racist and anti-fascist demonstrations in Germany. Domestic anarchist websites published information about these demonstrations.

In the second half of 2018, there was an intense political controversy about whether the **AfD** political party should be monitored for unconstitutionality. AfD maintains relationships with the Czech Republic, mainly thanks to the activities of a Bavarian politician with the Czech roots **Petr Bystron**. As the internal documents of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV – the domestic intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany) published at the beginning of 2019 revealed, this office gathered data justifying possible monitoring of the AfD. At the same time, it also used a comment from the Facebook profile of the Berlin AfD representative Bernd Pachal from May 2018, in which this politician described the events of 1938 as „the liberation of the Sudeten Germans“, and then addressed the alleged popularity of Reinhard Heydrich among the Czechs. He then assessed actions of the Czechs in 1945 as „very evil“. However, it needs to be stressed that in 2018, the party was not officially considered extremist in Germany.

In Germany on 7 March, a verdict for members of the right-wing extremist group **Bürgerwehr FTL/360**, who have made several attacks on asylum facilities in 2015, was delivered. They received sentences of four to ten years of imprisonment. They used pyrotechnics that is forbidden in Germany, which they bought at marketplaces in the Czech Republic. According to available information, they were not in direct contact with the Czech right-wing extremist scene. Even in 2018, information on shooting training of German neo-Nazis at shooting ranges in the Czech Republic appeared.

On 13 January, the former **Young National Democrats** association (**Junge Nationaldemokraten**) was renamed to **Young Nationalists (Junge Nationalisten – JN)**. This youth organization of the National Democratic Party Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – NPD) maintains long-term close relationships with right-wing

extremists in the Czech Republic. Their leading partner was the **Workers' Youth**, but in some of the contacts were also transferred to the **National and Social Front** in 2018.

Young Nationalists held the third international congress entitled „(Re)generation Europa“ in Riesa, Saxony, on 11 and 12 May. Representatives of right-wing extremist organizations from several countries were also invited, including the **Workers' Youth** from the Czech Republic. Representatives of the Czech **National and Social Front** also made an appearance in the „Open Microphone“ section. The controversy was aroused by concurrent invitation of the representatives of the All-Ukrainian Freedom Union (Всеукраїнське об'єднання Свобода) and the Russian Imperial Movement (Русское Имперское Движение - RID). Because of RID's policy towards Donbas, the Freedom Union did not attend the congress.

Nevertheless, members of the Ukrainian organization National Corps attended the event. Two members of the Young Nationalists visited the nationalist march in Ukraine in October, but the organization's leadership distanced itself from this participation. The Russian-Ukrainian dispute, together with the Polish-Ukrainian nationalist disagreements, had an impact on other pan-European activities of right-wing extremists in 2018.

Relations between European neo-Nazis have been maintained through music festivals (e.g., **Shield and Sword – Schild und Schwert** in the Saxon town of Ostritz in April) or through combat tournaments (e.g., **Nibelung Fight – Kampf der Nibelungen**). In connection with combat tournaments, the popularity of neo-Nazi sports clothing brands increased.

Czech right-wing extremists maintain long-term contacts with Polish colleagues. In particular, activists from Moravia attended the traditional **Independent March** within the so-called Black Block in Warsaw on 11 November. Compared to previous years, the authorities tried to organize one march without the participation of right-wing extremists, but they eventually walked a few dozens of meters behind the official party separately.

In 2018, Czech right-wing extremists and the anti-Islamic scene intensively reflected the case of a British activist **Tommy Robinson** (own name Stephen Christopher Yaxley-Lennon). He was detained in the United Kingdom for breaching regulations on rights of defendants in criminal proceedings (the so-called „**breach of the peace**“) when filming accused Muslims without court approval and claiming them guilty in advance. First, he was sentenced (in conjunction with the previous conditional sentence) to 13-months imprisonment, but the court of appeal canceled the sentence subsequently. Meanwhile, the case was interpreted as a breach of the right to freedom of expression for Robinson's political views by a large part of the extreme European right, including the Czech right-wing extremist scene. A campaign (**Free Tommy**) was organized to support his release. This campaign and its activists cannot be generally classified under the extremist scene; however, some right-wing extremists have also been involved.

## ***4.2. Left-wing extremism abroad with influence on the Czech Republic***

A part of the dogmatic communist spectrum in the Czech Republic adores North Korea's official policy. Representatives of the **Czech-Korean Friendship Society of**

**Pektusan and the Czech Group for the Study and Implementation of the Idea of Chucha** attended the 70th anniversary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pyongyang.

Several Czech anarchist activists have been involved in protests for Rescuing the Habash Forest in Germany. During the demonstrations, there were several confrontations between protesters and German police officers.

The Czech anarchist scene intensively supported foreign prosecuted or convicted anarchist activists in 2018, specifically during the August **Solidarity Week of Anarchist Prisoners**. Particular attention was paid to helping its colleagues **in Russia**, where a wave of repression against local anarchists took place. In response, a 17-year-old anarchist-communist **Michail Žlobickij** committed a suicidal bombing in the building of the Federal Security Service in Archangelsk on 31 August. He died during the bombing, and three other people were injured. The case was also commented on the website of the Anarchist Federation in the Czech Republic, where distrust towards individual attacks on authorities and regret over a lost young life were expressed. A detailed description of the case and related circumstances appeared on the website of the Czech branch of the Anarchist Black Cross.

In 2018, foreign anarchists expressed solidarity support to the **Autonomy Social Centre Klinika**. **Czech activists prosecuted in the Phoenix cases were also supported.**

Both domestic and foreign left-wing extremists significantly reflected the Kurdish-Turkish conflict. At the beginning of 2018, a Turkish military offensive was launched in the Syrian area inhabited by the Kurds at **Afrin**. Several demonstrations have taken place in the world to support the Syrian-Kurdish political entities (generally in favour of democratic confederalism), especially the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat – „PYD“); and its armed wing called the People's Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel – „YPG“). AA demonstration with the same focus also took place in Prague on 30 January.

On 24 February, a former PYD chairman and a member of the Diplomatic Relations Committee within the Democratic Society Movement (Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk - „TEV-DEM“) Saleh Muslim was detained at a Turkish request based on an extradition treatment. Some Kurds living in the Czech Republic protested against his extradition to Turkey. Kurds from Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, France, and other countries also came to support them. Some left-wing extremists also attended the gathering in Prague. Demonstrations against the release of Muslim also took place abroad, including in the UK, France, Denmark, Norway, and Canada.

The Municipal Court in Prague released Muslim from custody, and he subsequently left the Czech Republic. Turkey has expressed sharp diplomatic disagreement with this procedure. From the Turkish point of view, PYD (which is also a part of the TEV-DEM coalition) and YPG are branches of the **Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê – „PKK“)**. The party is listed on the so-called terrorist lists both in the EU and Turkey. Unlike the Czech Republic's official position, Turkey also considers PYD/YPG an offshoot of the PKK. At a demonstration in Prague on 26 February, participants also carried banners depicting **PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan**. In addition to PKK and PYD symbols, the symbols of Turkish left-wing extremist organization Partizan was also used. According to the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, it is one of the wings of the **Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist – TKP/ML)**. According to the German security forces, the members of the organization are lobbying for

the „**Confederation of Workers from Turkey in Europe**“ (**Avrupa Türkiye'li İşçiler Konfederasyonu -ATİK**), whose symbols also appeared at the Prague demonstration. These Turkish left-wing extremist organizations cooperate with a part of the Kurdish movement.

The case of Saleh Muslim Případ Sáliha Muslima also revived the discussion on the case of Markéta Všelichová and Miroslav Farkas, who are imprisoned in Turkey based on a 2017 sentence for participation in the YPG. Left-wing extremists often mention this case.

Czech anarchists and Trotskyists participated in supporting democratic confederalism and leftist forces in Rojava also with other activities (e.g., workshops, lectures, etc.). In the wake of another Turkish offensive, a new wave of protests took place across the world towards the end of 2018. In the Czech Republic, a small demonstration took place in Prague on 19 December. Left-wing extremists also attended the event. The gathering was organized by activists from the Czechoslovak-Kurdish Solidarity group (established in March 2018, it does not belong to the extremist spectrum as a whole).

The **Committee for the Defence of the Revolution in Rojava** was also established in autumn in the Czech anarchist environment. On 23 December, its members cast smoke bombs in the colours of YPG and YPJ in front of the Turkish Embassy in Prague. Several left-wing extremists and Kurdish media in the world informed also reported on the event. The modus operandi was similar to a smoke bomb attack on the Turkish Embassy in Bratislava on 28 March.

### **4.3 Religious extremism abroad**

In 2018, the territory of Syria and Iraq, which was so far dominated by the **Islamic State** terrorist organization, was significantly reduced. It retained partial positions in Afghanistan this year and expanded in the Philippines at the beginning of the year. The loss of positions of the Islamic State has also been reflected in Egypt in Sinai. Al-Shabab has been hostile to the Islamic State.

Perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Western countries nevertheless claimed affiliation to the Islamic State. In the vicinity of the crime scene, dozens of Czech citizens found themselves during the attack committed by **Cherif Chekatt in Strasbourg** on 11 December (it was not selectively directed against Czech citizens).

In Syria, on the contrary, the **Organization for the Liberation of Levant (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham)** maintained or even strengthened its position in some areas (especially in Idlib). It is a local branch of Al-Qaeda. So far, there are no known cases of terrorist attacks in Europe claimed by this organization. According to police charges, a married couple from the Czech Republic had previously been involved in the activities of this group (then called Jabhat Fateh al-Sham).

In 2018, attacks against soldiers of the Army of the Czech Republic were committed in Afghanistan. Three Czech soldiers were killed in Charikar on 5 August; one soldier was later killed at the Shindand base on 22 October. The website of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan reported on the attacks on Czech targets.

In **Poland**, a criminal trial was commenced with a Moroccan citizen **Mourad T.** in Katowice at the beginning of April. He was arrested by the Polish security forces in Polish Rybnik on 5 September 2016. According to the published information he was supposed to assist the Islamic State as an informant between 2014 and 2016, including Abdelhamid Abbaoud, who led the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. Mourad T. arrived in Poland **from the Czech Republic**, he stayed in the Czech border region, and the Czech and Polish intelligence services co-operated on his capture. He has plans to make bombs in his mobile phone. According to available information, he did not plan a terrorist attack in Poland or the Czech Republic. The trial with him was not completed by the end of 2018.

In Cologne, Germany, Syrian **Muhammad A R.** first **set fire to a fast-food shop** with the so-called Molotov cocktail and injured a 14-year-old girl, and subsequently **took hostage at a local pharmacy**. He claimed to belong to the **Islamic State**. He was seriously injured during the police intervention. The police investigations have not proved the link with the Islamic State but instead pointed to psychological issues of the offender. This man arrived in the **Czech Republic** with a Schengen visa issued by the **Czech Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon**, at the beginning of 2015. In March 2015, he traveled to Germany where he committed thirteen criminal offences. Germany missed the deadline set under the Dublin Rules allowing for his return to the Czech Republic. In the case of the Cologne attack and hostage-taking, the investigation was not completed by the end of 2018.

In January, the **Special Court in Sofia**, Bulgaria, launched a trial with two men who were supposed to assist in a suicide bomb terrorist attack on Israeli tourists at **Burgas Airport on 12 July 2012**. The Bulgarian bus driver and five Israelis perished as a result of this attack (another 32 were injured). **Hezbollah** was held liable for the attack. The perpetrator (Lebanese **Mohammad Hassan al-Hussein**) traveled to Bulgaria also through the **Czech Republic**. The trial is in the absence of both accused accomplices (one of them, Meliad F. has an Australian passport, and the other, Hassan al-H. has a Canadian passport but resides in Lebanon). No verdict was delivered in this case before the end of 2018.

#### **4.4 Other**

By the end of 2018, the so-called **yellow vests protest movement (mouvement des gilets jaunes)** emerged in France. Initially, it demanded a change in the carbon tax, which raised the cost of fuel. It was formed at the end of October. The first massive protests across France took place on 17 November, and several mass demonstrations took place by the end of the year. The movement published its broader political requests directed against the French president Emanuel Macron and the government. It also expanded abroad. A relatively strong media response was also gained in the Czech Republic. Shortly after its formation, the yellow vests movement was infiltrated by **both left-wing and right-wing extremists** who tried to use it to reach their goals. It resulted in criticism of former founders of the movement. Protests in Paris were also attended by activists linked to separatist regions in eastern Ukraine. A part of protesters engaged in **violent behaviour**. The yellow vests movement was widely popularized by Czech media known for spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories. It also found a response among both right-wing and left-wing domestic extremist scenes. By the end of 2018, these activities were mostly limited to a virtual environment. The most significant public event in the Czech Republic to support the yellow vests movement was the **March through Prague for peace, truth, and freedom** on 22 December. Similarly to other

countries, it is **not possible to label the yellow vests movement as extremist**, however. It is participated in by extremists from different directions.

## 5. List of abbreviations

APF – Alliance for Peace and Freedom (*Aliance za mír a svobodu*)

DSSS – Workers' Party of Social Justice (*Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti*)

ESSK – Statistical Recording System of Crime (*Evidenčně statistický systém kriminality*)

ND – National Democracy (*Národní demokracie*)

NPD – National Democratic Party of Germany (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*)

NPO – proposal for indictment

NSZ – Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office (*Nejvyšší státní zastupitelství*)

PMS – Probation and Mediation Service (*Probační a mediační služba*)

TZ – Criminal Code (*Trestní zákoník*)

ZPŘT – Shortened preliminary proceedings (*Zkrácené přípravné řízení*)